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From Publishers Weekly
As national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy was the prototypical best and brightest Vietnam War policymaker in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Bundy was, according to foreign policy scholar Goldstein, an out-and-out war hawk who again and again demonstrated a willingness, if not an eagerness, to deploy military means in Vietnam. Goldstein worked with Bundy in the year before his death, in 1996, on an uncompleted memoir and retrospective analysis of America's path to war. While drawing on that work in this warts-and-all examination of Bundy's advisory role, this book is something different, containing Goldstein's own conclusions. He painstakingly recounts his subject's role as national security adviser and ponders the complexities of the elusive inner Bundy: for example, the buoyant good humor in the 1960s that seemed unbowed by the weight of difficult strategic decisions. Among the surprising revelations: late in life Bundy came to regret his hawkish ways, although he maintained to the end that the presidents, not their advisers, were primarily responsible for the outcome of the war. Vietnam, he said, was overall, a war we should not have fought. (Nov.)
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From Booklist
An important addition to the literature of the Vietnam War, this analysis examines the man who was the president’s national security advisor from 1961 to 1966. For three decades afterward, Goldstein relates, McGeorge Bundy declined to write a memoir about his role in the decisions that plunged America into that war, but he changed his mind when Robert McNamara published his mea culpa In Retrospect (1995). Unfortunately, Bundy died before the project made much progress; posthumously, Goldstein pulled together a manuscript, but, he reports, Bundy’s widow quashed its publication and decreed its deposition in the archives of the JFK library. Therefore, this work does not derive from Bundy’s memoir; it is Goldstein’s negatively critical consideration of Bundy’s role on Vietnam. Flavored with anecdotes of Goldstein’s interactions with Bundy as his research assistant, the narrative conveys Bundy’s hawkish recommendations to JFK and LBJ, expresses Goldstein’s belief that the former would not have escalated the war as Johnson did, and hints that Bundy before his death might have been preparing a recantation on Vietnam. A vital volume for Vietnam War collections. --Gilbert Taylor

Review

"A compelling portrait of a man once serenely confident, searching decades later for self-understanding.... It offers insight into how Bundy, a man of surpassing skill and reputation, could have advised two presidents so badly. On the long shelf of Vietnam books, I know of nothing quite like it. The unfinished quality of Bundy’s self-inquest only enhances its power, authenticity and, yes, poignancy.... An extraordinary cautionary tale for all Americans."—Richard Holbrooke, The New York Times Book Review

"[Goldstein] painstakingly recounts his subject’s role as national security adviser and ponders the complexity of the elusive ‘inner Bundy’... surprising revelations."—Publishers Weekly

"Illuminate[s] the five years (1961-1966) during which the defense of South Vietnam was Americanized…. A strange yet fascinating book."—Newsweek

"Astute distillation of the essential lessons now-deceased national security adviser Bundy learned from Vietnam….an invaluable record of Bundy’s thoughts and actions during the war, as well as unusually candid commentary on his admitted failures in ‘perception, recommendation and execution.’… A significant then-and-now reassessment."—Kirkus Reviews

"No American who has lived through the Iraq experience will doubt how important it is for us to understand why and how American presidents take our country to war. Key to understanding how John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson took the nation into Vietnam is the story of McGeorge Bundy’s service to both men as national security adviser. Thanks to his many long and penetrating talks with Bundy, his assiduous study of the written record, and his mastery of the interplay among personality, politics, and national security strategy, Gordon Goldstein has brought us a dispassionate, powerful, and brilliant assessment of McGeorge Bundy’s performance during the years he was given his cardinal moment in history. Goldstein’s book helps us comprehend how Americans were led, step by step, into the abyss of Vietnam. It also provides crucial lessons for future presidents, members of Congress, and citizens as we grapple with the problems of where, when, and how to apply American power around the world."—Michael Beschloss

"A compelling and personally sympathetic appraisal of Bundy as a brilliant statesman but also as a fallible human being. Despite his remarkable intellect, Bundy ultimately failed to grasp the fundamental novelty of the historical challenge posed by a communism fanatically driven by nationalistic anticolonialist passions. In that context, presidential decision-making became increasingly focused on the imperatives of a local war and less on its damaging impact on America’s world role."—Zbigniew Brzezinski

"Thanks to Gordon Goldstein’s superb book, we have fresh evidence for judging between a facile mind and a wise one, and we can now assess more accurately the role of McGeorge Bundy in the Vietnam tragedy."—A. J. Langguth

"This meticulously researched book gives us remarkable insight into one of the most critical foreign policy decisions in U.S. history. Anyone aspiring to a leadership position in American politics or public policy should carefully examine this perceptive work and its many valuable lessons."—Warren B. Rudman, former U.S. senator (R–N.H.) and former chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 

"Gordon Goldstein's Lessons in Disaster provides a close, careful look at Kennedy's mindset at the time of his assassination.... As the title suggests, this fast-paced, well-written book is organized around the abiding lessons of Vietnam. Barack Obama and his new foreign policy advisers should read it."—Mike Pride, Concord Monitor

Customer Reviews

A Time fo Choosing
An intimate look at the beginnings of what became the Vietnam War, told by the author, but also through the eyes of McGeorge Bundy, who had a seat at the table when both Kennedy and Johnson made some of the most consequential decisions about the escalation of the conflict.

Debate has raged for decades over whether Kennedy would have pulled the troops out of Vietnam once he had won a second term. The answer, clearly, is no one will ever know for sure. Kennedy's approach was certainly more reserved than Johnson's, and he does at times, come off as one of the books few heroic figures. The reader can draw the conclusion that had Kennedy lived, he would not have approved the build-up that Johnson approved, but there isn't enough historical evidence to fully understand Kennedy's thinking.

Using the material he has to work with, the author does make a case that, as mentioned by a previous reviewer, George Ball was one of the few individuals whose resistance to a build-up in Vietnam seems almost prophetic in hindsight. Further, rather than seriously consult him for further information, the Best and the Brightest often referred to him as a court jester whose contrarian point of view was a mere formality. In the end, McNamara, Bundy and most everyone else was wrong. It's hard not to see a parallel to the decision to go to war in Iraq, though in this instance those who opposed a military action weren't tarred, feathered and accused of being unpatriotic.

At the same time, it is surprising to see how ambivalent Johnson was when he first received word of the "Gulf of Tonkin incidents" (another historical debate that will continue), until he realized how much political capital a stand against the communists Vietnamese would earn him in the face of a challenge from Barry Goldwater in 1964. When awoken in the middle of the night and initially greeted with the shady reports of an attack, Johnson makes a passing mental note and then immediately moves on to domestic issues.

The book follows several intertwining themes, most interestingly the personal agony Bundy experienced later in life as he reflected on his decision and contribution to history by making regular visits to the Vietnam Memorial Wall. And while sympathy may not be the first emotion that overtakes you, author Gordon Goldstein does an incredible job of painting a picture of an old broken down bureaucrat left to ponder the destruction his policies helped enable. Highly recommended read for fans of history, as well as for foreign policy wonks.

An Excellent but Painful Analysis of the Buildup of the Vietnam War
Reading "Lessons in Disaster; McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam" is a very painful experience - especially if one happens to be a Vietnam veteran -- because the book demonstrates that most of American leadership in Washington during the Vietnam era consisted of a group of incompetents.

That is not a happy conclusion to take away from this book, but it is an inescapable one. There are few heroes in this book. John F. Kennedy may have been one (his assassination precluded any final judgments). George Ball was consistently steadfast in his opposition to the Vietnam. There were others, including Mike Mansfield. But otherwise the senior political leadership in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations was woefully short of the leadership standards one would expect from one of the world's leading powers. And in this narrative the biggest knucklehead of all was McGeorge Bundy, the Harvard intellectual whom JFK chose as his national security advisor, and who remained as the principal national security adviser to President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 as LBJ "Americanized" the war in Vietnam that he inherited from JFK.

That's a harsh judgment and an even sadder comment. Especially since the author says Bundy made "regular" visits in his final years to the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, no doubt contemplating the families who were mourning their lost ones. Those must have been poignant moments for the Harvard Brahmin, because one has to assume that Bundy knew he engineered one of America's greatest foreign policy fiascos - costing the lives of more than 58,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese. So he apparently had genuine regret over his role in that war, and at the least we have to respect him for that.

The one thought that nags one throughout the book is why was McGeorge Bundy, a 34-year-old dean of students at Harvard College was elevated to one of the key security positions in the American government? After all, Bundy had virtually no practical experience in foreign or military affairs. Most of his life was spent in the ivory towers of elite universities with little exposure to real life. He had accumulated no wisdom culled from the hard knocks of life. Indeed he had no hard knocks in his life.

Bundy came from an old blue-blood Boston family, and apparently it was that pedigree that attracted JFK. And that ill-fitted pedigree may have been the problem, because from the gitgo, Bundy was not a very effective national security adviser. He had neither the knowledge nor the hands-on experience to understand or manage the nuances of foreign affairs.

Gordon Goldstein, the author of this excellent book, tells the tale of how a group of assistants to Bundy (who was on vacation at his wife's beach's house north of Boston) sent an overnight cable from the White House to the U.S. embassy in Saigon, suggesting that South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem should be replaced. This single cable, sent when all the key officials were out of Washington over a lazy summer weekend, changed the entire direction of American policy in Southeast Asia.

Less than three months after the cable was sent Diem was dead. Three weeks after his death, JFK was also dead, and LBJ was president; worse, the American policy in Indochina was about to go off the cliff.

The insecure LBJ wanted all of JFK's White House staff to remain so that there would be continuity. And most complied, including Bundy. It becomes apparent from this narrative that Bundy liked being at the pinnacle of power in Washington and that taste of power clearly was one of his biggest motivations to flex the sinews of American military might.

But, in fact, keeping on the JFK staff was a crucial mistake for Johnson - and the country. JFK knew his foreign policy, including personal acquaintances with most of the overseas leaders, and he was essentially his own Secretary of State (e.g. the appointment of Dean Rusk). Especially after the Bay of Pigs episode, JFK had an instinctive distrust of any and all advice he received from his own senior staff, and anyone else for that matter, and Goldstein concludes that JFK would never have allowed the introduction of substantial American ground forces into Vietnam, despite the recommendations of people like Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy.

But LBJ was an easy mark for the hawks. In the early months of his presidency Johnson was more concerned with the election he knew he would have to win to remain in office. LBJ told Bundy to put Vietnam essentially on "hold" for the first half of the year, so that bad news from Southeast Asia would not derail Johnson's election prospects - especially in view of the hawkish campaign of Republican Sen. Barry Goldwater. Then, on Aug. 2, 1964, an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin gave LBJ all the motivation he needed to seize the campaign initiative and cement his national security credentials.

Events surrounding the North Vietnamese attacks on American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin (off North Vietnam) have always been murky. But when a second (again murky) incident took place on Aug. 4, Johnson realized he had been handed his ace in the hole, and within three days, Congress had overwhelming passed the Gulf of Tokin resolution giving LBJ the power to escalate the war in Vietnam. Bundy almost immediately recommended that LBJ consider sending two brigades of U.S. troops to take the Viet Cong on directly in South Vietnam. Goldstein writes:

"While Bundy's proposal for an initial combat troop deployment to South Vietnam was itself momentous - the brigades would arrive two weeks before the election - his memorandum was silent on the broader strategic concept for how the United States would prevail in a counterinsurgency ground war."

Which brings up another weakness about Bundy's performance as a national security adviser. His focus was political, not strategic or tactical. Goldstein reports that most of Bundy's ruminations during (and after) his service in Washington were concerned with the political aspects of national security. His recommendations rarely dealt with the military mechanics of achieving political goals. He was quick to recommend escalations of troop levels or bombing campaigns, but he didn't bother with the details on how to implement those recommendations so to maximize success in the overall objectives of American foreign policy.

And, Goldstein reports, even in mid-1964, when the State Department or the Pentagon did conduct strategic studies (SIGMA I and SIGNMA II) on American bombing in Vietnam that indicated the bombing would only motivate Hanoi to continue the fight, Bundy ignored them.

Bundy, of course was not the only Johnson adviser to advocate escalation in Vietnam. Defense Secretary McNamara was the principal architect of the war, and Rusk and others were also pushing Johnson. Indeed McNamara recommended that troop strength be boosted to 175,000 by late 1965, and it was onward and upwards from there. McNamara, of course, recanted his war advocacy a self-serving book, "In Retrospect" that many considered a unique feat of hind-sighted hypocrisy.

By 1965, Bundy's relations with LBJ were deteriorating. Bundy spent a lot of time in Boston where the anti-war forces were located, and he was in constant contact with his old Harvard friends who were all becoming doves, as well as the media which was also turning against the war. Bundy felt the need to defend his performance in Washington (he was always a transparent individual), and he offered to go on television to debate the doves. LBJ forced him to cancel one appearance, but Bundy soon scheduled another with CBS, which did take place. When LBJ found out he was enraged and the relationship between the president and Bundy effectively ended at that point.

In 1966, Bundy became president of the Ford Foundation, where he remained for some years. But he never got over the fiasco in Vietnam, and he spent the rest of his life trying to figure out what went wrong. Sadly, from the "fragments" of notes that Bundy wrote to himself that Goldstein includes in this excellent book he never did figure it out.


Note: The writer served in Vietnam in 1968, conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Mekong Delta; he subsequently become a war correspondent and covered the wars in Cambodia and Laos He left Phnom Penh in 1975 on one of the last American evacuation helicopters.

Managed to Catastrophe
This fascinating book tracks the US escalation in Vietnam under Kennedy and Johnson primarily through the career of McGeorge Bundy, who served as national security adviser to each of those presidents from 1961 to 1966. The story encompasses at least three serous failures in the decision making process, one of which can be attributed to each of the presidents and the other to those who advised the presidents.

Kennedy procrastinated on serious decisions about Vietnam, a procrastination that eventually led to the displacement and murder of Diem and a series of utterly ineffective Vietnamese governments. Johnson subordinated all decisions to US domestic political considerations and his desire to appear to stand up to communism. In the summer of 1964 Johnson allowed Congress to be misled regarding the naval incidents in the Tonkin Gulf and pocketed the resulting Tonkin Gulf Resolution for use at his discretion. After the 1964 election Johnson privately decided to escalate US commitments in Vietnam, including using combat troops there, and manipulated the decision making process to obtain the desired result.

The advisers also failed. Johnson intimidated them, including Bundy. They did not present all options objectively. What was presented was often vague and devoid of supporting evidence. There was no defined overall objective, no fall back plan if the proffered plan was not successful and no exit plan. Above all there was no analysis of underlying assumptions, such as the domino theory or the idea that the "loss" of Vietnam would be a critical blow to US positions all over the world. Bundy seemed to accept the idea that the commitment of 100,000 or more men was worth it although he was aware of facts and studies that showed that such a commitment would be ineffective.

Bundy personally cuts a poor figure. He lost credibility with Kennedy because of inadequate performance, and he apparently never had much credibility with Johnson. He failed to force his office and others to undertake the hard look at Vietnam that the situation required and that was his duty to see undertaken. He failed to fulfill the basic obligations of the national security adviser. For all his supposedly great organizational ability and allegedly formidable analytical intelligence, he was unqualified for his post and failed dismally at his job. On the evidence of this book, even Bundy's effort in the last eighteen months of his life to analyze the events of 1961-65 seems to have yielded few useful final conclusions or insights, but Goldstein was able to work well with what he had (fortunately for Bundy).

In the last chapter Goldstein presents a good argument that, had Kennedy survived, he would have refused to commit combat troops to Vietnam. In the end, however, the question of what Kennedy would have done is both irresoluble and irrelevant because Kennedy did not survive. A sad story and one that we recently repeated.